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Abstract 
 The NBA is widely known as the least competitively balanced professional sports league 
in North America. Past literature has shown that as competitive balance declines, so does fan 
interest and revenues for both individual teams and the league as a whole. In 2003, the NBA 
implemented a luxury tax,a penalty mechanism that taxes teams who spend above the salary cap, 
in order to improve competitive balance. Using luxury tax and league level production data from 
the 1998 to 2016 NBA seasons, and a model that estimates competitive balance, this paper 
investigates whether the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003 positively affected competitive 
balance in the NBA. The results indicate that competitive balance significantly improved from 
2003 to 2012 compared to the seasons prior to the implementation of the luxury tax. 
Additionally, I find that the more teams pay in luxury tax, the worse competitive balance 
becomes, suggesting that as teams stockpile more talent, the league becomes competitively 
imbalanced as a result.     
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1 Introduction 
 
 In 2010, LeBron James, widely considered to be the best basketball player in the world, 
decided to team up with two perennialall-stars: Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh. This was the first 
time in NBA history that three of the most talented players in the world decided to leave their 
respective franchises, team up with other all-stars, and compete for an NBA championship. With 
their extraordinary success, winning two NBA championships in four seasons, a new era in 
basketball was created: the super team era. Since then, all-stars like Kevin Durant, Jimmy Butler, 
Paul George, and Carmelo Anthony have left their franchises in order to compete for 
championships with other all-stars(Bontemps, 2017). As a result of the new super team era, a few 
teams with an extraordinary amount of talent compete for NBA championships, while the rest of 
the league is lost without a franchise player. This created a competitive balance issue that the 
NBA had never seen before.   
 Competitive balance is the degree of parity or equality among teams in a sports league 
(Leeds, 2016). It is essential to both individual franchises and the league as a whole to be 
somewhat competitively balanced. Both El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) and Coates and Humphreys 
(2012) find that fan attendance drops when a league is less competitively balanced. 
Consequently, there is less money to be made by both individual franchises and the league as a 
whole when fan interest declines. Because of the NBA’s awareness of the importance of 
competitive balance, they implemented policies including a salary cap and luxury tax meant to 
evenly disperse talent throughout the NBA and improve competitive balance. The salary cap is 
the maximum amount of money a team can spend on player salaries, while the luxury tax is a 
penalty mechanism that taxes teams for overspending above the salary cap (Coon, 2017). 
Although the NBA has several policies that attempt to control fluctuations in competitive 
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balance, the salary cap and specifically the luxury tax may be the NBA’s greatest mechanism of 
defense in controlling competitive balance. With the super team era considerably affecting the 
NBA’s competitive balance, those policies have recently come into question.  
 As recently as 2013, the NBA increased the tax rate of the luxury tax in order to further 
incentivize teams to not over spend on player talent, but it is unknown whether competitive 
balance has improved.While there is a great deal of literature involving competitive balance in 
the world of sports, no paper has utilized data from the NBA toanalyze the potential effect of the 
NBA luxury tax on competitive balance. I attempt to fill the gap in literature by examining the 
effectiveness of combating competitive balance issues with a luxury tax. I investigate whether 
the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003 positively affected competitive balance in the NBA. 
Additionally, because the luxury tax was implemented in 2003 and reconstructed in 2013, I 
establish three eras of the luxury tax: pre-luxury tax (1998–2002), original luxury tax (2003–
2012), and new luxury tax (2013–2016), and determine which era produced the most 
competitively balanced NBA.I create a model that estimates competitive balance from 1998 to 
2016 by using luxury tax and league level production data. 
 My findings provide evidence that since the implementation of the luxury tax in 2003, 
competitive balance has improved in the NBA. Specifically, from 2003 to 2012, competitive 
balance significantly improved from the 1998 to 2002 seasons in two of the three competitive 
balance measures that I analyze. Additionally, I find that the more teams pay in luxury tax, the 
worse competitive balance becomes, suggesting that as teams stockpile more talent, the league 
becomes competitively imbalanced as a result.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 will discuss the background 
and relevance of the luxury tax in the NBA. Section 3 is an in-depth review of literature on 
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competitive balance and the validity of a luxury tax. Section 4 describes the data I use, while 
section 5 details the model I created to measure the affect of the luxury tax on competitive 
balance in the NBA. Section 6 interprets the results and section 7 discusses policy implications, 
errors in my research, and pathways for future research on this topic.  
 
2 Background 
 
 As polarizing and exciting as the NBA can be, it has been criticized for being the least 
competitive of the four major sports in North America (Kilgore, 2017). More often than in 
football, baseball, and hockey, basketball fans and professional analysts seem to think that 
season outcomes are somewhat predictable because of the lack of competitive balance in the 
NBA. In other words, the league is so bottom heavy that only a few teams have a legitimate 
chance of winning the championship at the end of the season. For example: in the last 18 NBA 
seasons, only 8 out of the 30 NBA teams have won the championship, which means a small 
number of teams consistently contend for the NBA title, while the other 22 seem to never be 
competitive (Basketball Reference, 2017). In order to combat competitive balance issues, in the 
1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NBA Player’s Association and owners agreed on 
implementing multiple policies including the luxury tax. The luxury tax is a penalty mechanism 
that taxes teams for exceeding the maximum team salary cap and redistributes that money to 
non-offenders. By doing so, the NBA is incentivizing teams not to over-spend on player talent 
which they hope will evenly distribute talent throughout the 30 teams. 
 As a result of the past collective bargaining agreements, the NBA has created and 
implemented several policies to attempt to improve competitive balance. This review focuses on 
the luxury tax because there is a lack of literature on how it could affect competitive balance in 
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professional sports. The luxury tax is a mechanism that controls team spending (Coon, 2017). It 
is a tax that the league imposes on teams who exceed the salary cap, which is a maximum 
amount of money a franchise can spend on player salaries. Therefore, the luxury tax is 
essentially an extension of the salary cap. The NBA salary cap is unique in that it is a soft cap in 
which teams can exceed the predetermined amount that teams are allowed to spend on player 
salaries. The punishment for exceeding the soft cap is the luxury tax. In contrast, the NFL and 
NHL have a hard cap which is a non-negotiable maximum amount of money to spend on player 
salaries (Leeds, 2016). Additionally, the MLB has no salary cap but rather just a luxury tax that 
penalizes teams for spending over the set threshold.  
 With regards to competitive balance, the NFL, NHL, and MLB are recognized as more 
balanced leagues than the NBA. This can be proven by looking at the ratio of standard deviation 
of winning percentage to the ideal standard deviation in the league. Standard deviation of 
winning percentage is heavily skewed based on the number of games in a season, so the ideal 
standard deviation takes that into account. Because each team has a 0.5 probability to win a 
game, the ideal standard deviation can be calculated by:  
Ideal Standard Deviation of Winning Percentage = 
0.5
√𝐺
 
where G is the number of games in a season. The closer the actual standard deviation of winning 
percentage is to the ideal, the more competitively balanced a league is. Table 1 presents the 
actual, ideal, and ratio of standard deviation of winning percentages in 2011 for the four major 
sports in North America. It is no surprise that the NHL and NFL are the most competitively 
balanced leagues because they are the only leagues with a hard salary cap. Based on the ratio, the 
NBA is the least competitively balanced league.  
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Table 1: Dispersion of Winning Percentages 2011 (Leeds, 2016) 
League Actual Ideal  Ratio 
NHL 0.080 0.056 1.43 
NFL 0.201 0.125 1.61 
MLB 0.069 0.039 1.77 
NBA 0.158 0.056 2.82 
 
 There are many factors that could have led to the NBA becoming the least competitively 
balanced league, but the structure of the soft salary cap may be a driving force. It is clear that the 
NBA does not want to inhibit a team’s ability to stack talent based on their salary cap policies. In 
addition to the soft cap, there are three contract exceptions that allow teams to further exceed the 
salary cap with no penalty: Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird Exceptions. The Rookie Exception 
allows a team to sign a rookie to his first contract even if it puts the team over the cap (Leeds, 
2016). The Midlevel Exception allows a team to sign one player to the average NBA salary when 
the team is over the cap (Leeds, 2016). Lastly, the Larry Bird Exception allows teams to re-sign 
players who were already on their roster even if the team is over the cap (Leeds, 2016). An 
example of a team utilizing the opportunity to sign extra talent without exceeding the luxury tax 
is the 2018 Houston Rockets. The Rockets were competing for a championship and were already 
at the $99 million salary cap threshold, but wanted to add more talent in order to compete with 
the Golden State Warriors. They were able to sign veteran PJ Tucker to a Mid Level 
Exceptioncontract of $7.5 million without being penalized (Mahoney, 2017). Otherwise if the 
three exception slots are filled and the team is over the soft cap, they are taxed. The luxury tax 
forces teams to pay an increasing tax rate for every additional $5 million they are over the cap 
(Coon, 2017) (Table 1).  
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Table 2: The increasing luxury tax rate that teams must pay for exceeding the soft salary 
cap in the NBA (Coon, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, if a team is $8 million over the salary cap, they would pay $5 million plus the tax 
rate of 1.5, and an additional $3 million plus the tax rate of 1.75. So in total, a team over the 
salary cap by $8 million will pay $12.75 million. Once all the luxury tax money is collected by 
the league office, 50 percent is redistributed to teams who did not exceed the salary, which gives 
teams incentives to not over spend, while the other 50 percent is used for “league purposes” 
(Coon, 2017). Additionally, the NBA created a repeat offender clause to the luxury tax that raises 
the tax rate for perennial over spenders, thus further incentivizing teams to not over spend. No 
team has ever paid the “repeat offender” tax because it was implemented in 2013 (Coon, 2017). 
 In theory, the luxury tax could be an effective way to stop owners from overspending on 
player talent and going over the cap, but in the end, it might not be the most effective method. 
The problem that arises from a luxury tax is the distinction between two types of owners: profit 
and win maximizers. If an owner believes wins are more important than profit, then the luxury 
tax might not make a difference to them and they would be willing to pay the tax anyway. Team 
owners have so much money that if the difference between winning and losing is paying an extra 
$12.5 million for a talented player, then win maximizing owners will always invest in extra 
talent. This is especially problematic because spending over the salary cap in order to sing extra 
talent has proven to be a successful method to win more games. Table 3 shows that since 2003, 
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teams that pay the luxury tax in a given year have significantly higher winning percentages 
compared to seasons when they do not pay the luxury tax (p<0.05). Additionally, since 2003 
eleven out of the 14 NBA champions (79%) paid some amount of luxury tax the year they won 
the championship (Basketball Reference, 2017). 
Table 3: Average winning percentage for teams when they pay luxury tax and when they do not. 
(*=p<0.05) 
  
Paying 
Luxury Tax 
Not Paying 
Luxury Tax 
Atlanta  0.52 0.47 
Boston 0.63 0.45 
Brooklyn/ NJ 0.55 0.40 
Charlotte n/a 0.44 
Chicago 0.53 0.48 
Cleveland 0.69 0.41 
Dallas 0.68 0.52 
Denver 0.60 0.46 
Detroit 0.66 0.50 
Golden State 0.89 0.43 
Houston  0.51 0.55 
Indiana  0.59 0.54 
LA Clippers 0.68 0.38 
LA Lakers 0.63 0.57 
Memphis/VAN 0.47 0.43 
Miami 0.60 0.56 
Milwaukee 0.51 0.45 
Minnesota 0.57 0.40 
New Orleans n/a 0.47 
New York 0.40 0.51 
Oklahoma City/ 
SEA 0.61 0.54 
Orlando 0.60 0.48 
Philadelphia 0.50 0.44 
Phoenix 0.61 0.54 
Portland 0.59 0.54 
Sacramento 0.70 0.43 
San Antonio 0.73 0.70 
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Toronto 0.35 0.47 
Utah 0.57 0.56 
Washington n/a 0.41 
League Average  0.59* 0.48 
Charlotte, New Orleans, and Washington have never paid luxury tax. 
*=p<0.05 
 
This creates a problem for profit maximizing owners as the luxury tax could impede them from 
signing extra talent in fear of paying the luxury tax. As a result, in an effort to improve 
competitive balance, the luxury tax could in theory give win maximizing owners an even greater 
advantage than they had before. Based on these theories, the effectiveness of a salary cap and 
luxury tax has been heavily covered by sports economists. 
 
3 Literature Review 
 
 The goal of this section is to examine the potential effectiveness of combating 
competitive balance issues with a luxury tax by using evidence from past literature and sports 
economic theories. The review will consist of four sections: the history of competitive balance, 
measures of competitive balance, theories behind the NBA’s lack of competitiveness, and a 
discussion onthe current landscape of salary cap. 
 
3.1 Historyof Competitive Balance 
 
 This section will offer a history of the discourse on competitive balance and its 
significance in professional sports. In most industries, competing firms try to maximize profits 
and outlast competitors so they can gain a larger share of the market. Hypothetically,if a firm 
outperforms the competition, they can increase market power, raise prices, and earn more profit. 
In contrast, this is not the case in professional sports. Competing sports teams rely on the 
economic success of their rivals because a more profitable league as a whole translates to more 
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revenue for individual teams. This meansthat a league can be more profitable if the majority of 
the teams are successful rather than just a few. Additionally, it isin the best interest of an 
individual city for their team to be prosperous as Davis(2010) found that a successful NFL 
franchise can raise a city’s real per capita personal income by enhancing productivity in the 
workplace. Although his findings may be controversial as the relationship between team success 
and real per capita personal income could be correlation and not causation, it does raise the idea 
that a team’s success on the court could improve the well being of an entire city.  
 Not only does economic competitive balance help the league overall, but competitive 
balance on the playing field is just as important. The reason why fans watch sports is because 
they like watching an event in which the outcome is unknown. This desire for competition is 
called the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (Leeds, 2016). Essentially, the theory states that 
fans will buy tickets or watch games on television more frequently if the outcome of a game is 
not obvious (Leeds, 2016).Because of this phenomenon, there have been several economic 
studies on how to measure competitive balance and why it is important for a league’s overall 
success.  
 The first study on competitive balance was conducted by Rottenberg (1956) as he 
discussed many new concepts involving the economics of professional sports. He stated, “The 
nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximately equal ‘size’ if any are to 
be successful. This seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive sports.” He was the 
first to suggest that not only is professional sports a unique industry, but also that leagues need to 
be competitive to succeed. Additionally, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) created the first model 
considering competitive balance and found that less competitive leagues have lower fan 
attendance overall. In their model, they derived gate receipts as a function of the stock of player 
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talent on teams, the amount of player talent purchased through free agency, the amount of player 
talent acquired through the draft, the wages of existing players on the roster, and the added costs 
of signing players via draft and free agency. The shortcoming of their model comes in the 
definition of player talent. The authors assumed that a player being added to an existing roster 
will increase the overall talent pool of the team, when in reality that may not be the case. The 
authors failed to use efficiency statistics like batting average or on base percentage to evaluate 
talent. With that in mind, the main takeaway from their study suggests that although it is in a 
team’s best interest to be superior to the rest of the league, teams should avoid becoming “too” 
superior because game attendance will drop as a result of a violation in the Uncertainty of 
Outcome Hypothesis.  An example of this phenomenon is when the New York Yankees won 8 
World Series championships in a span of 12 years in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. When the 
Yankees won in 1949, a total of 2.3 million people attended Yankees’ home games, while after 
their 5th world series title in 1953, attendance dropped to 1.5 million (Baseball Reference, 2017). 
As a result of utter dominance in their sport, game attendance plummeted because the fans knew 
who was going to win.  
 In contrast toEl-Hodiri and Quirk’s (1971) results, Coates and Humphreys (2012) 
questioned the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis and found evidence that suggested it is not an 
uncertain outcome that fans want, but rather an increased chance that the home team wins. 
Unlike El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), the authors take consumer decision making and loss aversion 
into consideration because of their anticipation of the Prospect Theory: the idea that expected 
losses are treated differently than expected gains. Essentially, the Prospect Theory suggests that 
consumers are driven by the potential value of losses and gains rather than just the final outcome 
of a situation. In other words, because people are generally loss averse, they value gains much 
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higher than losses. In the context of sports, because fans are usually loss averse, they are more 
likely to attend games that they perceive their team has a good chance of winning because the 
utility gained if their team wins is much higher than the utility lost if their team loses. Therefore, 
the authors believe fan attendance is driven by the individual fan’s evaluations of expected 
gained or lost utility, rather than the uncertainty of the outcome of the game.  
 The assumption that the Prospect Theory had influence on consumer’s decision making 
to attend games was a revolutionary idea. The main findings were that fans are more likely to 
attend games in which the home team is predicted to win and less likely to attend closely 
predicted games. This suggests that fans value a win from the home team over the thrill of 
watching their team lose a close game. These results further imply the importance of competitive 
balance because if there are only a few superior teams, the worst teams will rarely have a chance 
to win home games, resulting in decreased attendance for several franchises.Regardless of 
whether the Coates and Humphreys hypothesis using Prospect Theory or the Uncertainty of 
Outcome Hypothesis is the main driving force for game attendance, both of their results suggest 
that it is in a league's best interest to be competitively balanced.  
 
3.2 Measures of Competitive Balance 
 In this section, the creation, evolution, and validity of different competitive balance 
measurements will be discussed. Although it is clear that competitive balance is an important 
factor in a thriving sports league, past literature has disagreed upon which measure of 
competitive balance is most effective. The disagreement from contributing authors does not 
necessarily stem from theories being flawed, but rather from the existence of a plethora of 
feasible ways to measure competitive balance. Competitive balance can be investigated at 
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theseason and championship level. For example, some believe that leagues are the most balanced 
when every team has the same chance to win any given game, thusthe difference between the 
winning percentages of the best and worst teams would be relatively small. Others believe that 
the turnover of champions defines a competitively balanced league. An example of a 
competitively balanced league at the championship level would be the NFL in the early 2010s 
when from 2009 to 2016, eight different teams won the Super Bowl (Pro-Football Reference, 
2017). In other words, there are several ways to measure competitive balance and one is not 
necessarily better than another.  
 In order to describe the state of competitive balance in professional sports, Fort and Quirk 
(1995) used the most common measure of competitive balance which is within season variation 
measured by standard deviation of winning percentages. This measure shows how far from or 
close to the league’s average a team's winning percentage is. If there are teams with large 
standard deviations, then the league is not very competitive. This method has its limitations as it 
is simplistic and may not capture the distribution of competitiveness within a league. Therefore, 
Humphreys (2002) created his own measure that shows competitive balance between seasons. 
Humphreys derives a new way to measure competitive balance called the Competitive Balance 
Ratio(CBR). This variable differs from the traditional standard deviation approach as it observes 
the variation of the win-loss ratio of teams over several seasons. Traditional competitive balance 
measures failto capture changes in the relative standings of sports teams over time, and CBR is 
considered a more accurate measure of parity in a league across seasons (Humphreys, 2002).This 
measure is a useful tool because although it is effective to analyze how competitive a league is 
based on one season’s results, evaluating several seasons could capture the bigger picture and 
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truly define how competitive a league actually is. Humphreys (2002) derives CBR using five 
equations: 
   𝜎𝑇,𝑖= √∑ (
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑇
)
2
𝑖  (1) 
    
                                            𝜎𝑁,𝑖= √∑ (
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−0.500𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑁
)
2
𝑖 (2) 
 
     𝜎𝑇 =  
∑ 𝜎𝑇,𝑖𝑖
𝑁
                   (3)    𝜎𝑁 =
 
∑ 𝜎𝑇,𝑖𝑖
𝑇
  (4)       CBR =
𝜎𝑇̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎𝑁̅̅ ̅̅
  
 (5)  
In equation 1, Tis defined as the difference betweenteami’s winning percentage in seasontand 
the team’s average winning percentage over T seasons. This means the largerTbecomes, the 
more a team’s fortunes change from year to year. In other words, if Twas 0 then the team’s 
record would be the same every year. In equation 2, Nis a vector for within-season variation in 
winning percentages measured by the standard deviation of the winning percentage in each 
season across all teams in the league. Equations 4 and 5 translateteam-level values of Tand 
Ninto league level data by summingTand Nvalues of all 30 teams and dividing by number 
of teams for Tand by number of seasons for N.In equation 5, CBR is defined as a ratio of the 
sum Tand the sum of N.  
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 Like all competitive balance measures, CBR has limitations. When examining variation 
between seasons, the measure is meant to capture how a team’s performance varies over a time 
period. The measure does just this, but there is no one standard against which to judge variation 
between seasons. In other words, one team’s variation in winning percentage is not necessarily 
better than that of another. It is impossible to say whether owners and fans care more about how 
much their team’s winning percentage varies, or how the team’s position changes relative to 
other teams. For example, a team could have large variation in winning from year to year by 
winning the championship one year, and having the worst winning percentage the next year. On 
the other hand, a team could be consistently performing at the same level and finish at the top of 
the league without winning the championship in the end. Therefore, it is the owner’s and fan’s 
personal perspective of which situation is preferable.  
 Dorian (2007) used the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competitive 
balance by counting the number of teams that won a championship in a given period of time. 
HHI can be calculated using one simple equation: 
HHI = ∑ (
𝑐𝑖
𝑇
)
2
𝑖  
where the number of championships team i won in a given period (c1), is divided by the number 
of years in that period (T) and squared.The HHI is a useful measure in determining the turnover 
of champions in a given sport and was derived from Rottenberg’s (1956) analysis of counting the 
amount of times an MLB team won the pennant. The issue with HHI is that the measure only 
uses championship as a measuring stick for success and ignores other variables of success. 
Additionally, it can be heavily influenced by the number of teams in a league. With this in 
mind,Depken (1999) expanded upon HHI to create dHHI, a measure which controls for the 
growing or shrinking number of teams within a league. dHHI also does not take championships 
 18 
into account because (Depken 1999) did not believe winning a championship was the only 
measure of success in a league. dHHI can be written as: 
dHHI = 
4
𝑁2𝐺2
∑ [𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖]
2 −𝑁𝑖=1
1
𝑁
 
where N is the number of teams in the league, and G is the numbers of games played in a season. 
 In summary, there is no right or wrong way to measure competitive balance as each 
measure focuses on a different aspect of competitiveness in a league. Measurements of within 
season variation, between season variation, and championship turnover rates are all valid ways in 
describing competitive balance and can be effective in their own way. After having discussed the 
history and evolution of competitive balance measures, the next section will be focused on 
theories that attempt to explain why the NBA specifically is the least balanced major sport.  
 
3.3 Competitive Balance in the NBA 
 In an effort to describe why competitive balance differs in major sports, Zimbalist (2002) 
explains that distinctive fan pressure, technology, demographic, playing rules and field 
conditions all affect a sport’s competitive balance differently. He essentially states that there may 
be exogenous sport specific reasons that cause differences in competitive balance among 
leagues. On that note, basketball is a unique sport that gives certain athletes advantages that may 
not be seen in other sports. A natural competitive imbalance may be created because of this. 
Berri et al (2005) rationalize that the reason competitive imbalance still persists in the NBA is 
because of a short supply of tall people. In basketball, height gives an advantage not applicable 
in other sports and players who are both tall and particularly talented are extremely rare. Teams 
that can attainthese tall, talented players gaina competitive edge. This conclusion suggests that 
no matter what policies the NBA creates to improve competitive balance, there will always be a 
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degree of competitive imbalance because of the natural advantages the sport gives to a very 
small population of players. Additionally, the rules of basketball may also give advantages to 
teams that are not seen in other major sports. Rockerbie (2014) claims that the rules of basketball 
give a considerable advantage to teams with more stacked talent. This is because there are more 
scoring attemptsin basketball than in any other sport, which allows star players to have a bigger 
impact on any given game. This makes sense because at any given time, there are only five 
players on the court for each team, which means a star playernot only has the most time with the 
ball, but they also have the greatest chance to score compared to other sports. Therefore, with the 
combination of the most scoring attempts in any sport, and star players having the ability to 
affect the game more dramatically, the rules of basketball give natural advantages to teams who 
are able to stockpile talent. Rockerbie (2014) backs this claim byprovingthe NBA is indeed the 
least competitive major sport by using a standard deviation measure for league parity. Clearly, if 
a team has more talent they have a greater chance to win in any sport, but because of the high 
amount of scoring opportunities in basketball, stars can have a much greater impact on individual 
games. Therefore, the role of the luxury tax in the NBA is pertinent to mitigating how teams 
stack talent and ultimately shift the competitive balance.  
 
3.4 Salary Cap and Luxury Tax Models and Theories 
 This section will discuss how current literature views the introduction and validity of 
both a salary cap and luxury tax. Kesenne (2000) created a “two-club” model and showed the 
potential effect of the introduction of the salary cap in a large and small market team. He found 
that overall competitive balance improved with the implementation of a salary cap because large 
market teams would not be able to sign the most talented players and overall, player talent 
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wouldbe more evenly distributed throughout the league. The author also found that profit 
margins of small market and large market teams even out, as small market teams made a larger 
profit as a result of a salary cap. Fort and Quirk (1995) found similar results as they discovered 
large market teams have unfair advantages that create higher revenue streams in comparison to 
small markets and can therefore spend more money on player salaries. They conclude that an 
implementation of a salary cap would even the playing field so large firms could not spend more 
on talent, thus improving competitive balance. Although both Kesenne (2000) and Fort and 
Quirk (1995) come to the same conclusion, neither paper used data from an actual sports league 
as they created completely theoretical models. Still, these papers are relevant concluding that an 
introduction of a salary cap could improve competitive balance.  
 Giocoli (2007) is the first paper to account for whether an owner is a profit maximizer or 
win maximizer and created a model that makes this distinction. He discovered that with the 
assumption that only some owners are truly trying to win, parity is decreased in a league because 
win maximizers simply win more. Therefore, he concluded that the addition of a salary cap 
would impact the spending habits of win maximizers and improve overall competitive balance. 
Unfortunately, because the paper is about a salary cap and not a luxury tax, it does not discuss 
the potential increasing win gap between win and profit maximizing owners that might arise as 
an outcome of a luxury tax. 
 Additionally, Hastings (2015) studied the effect of the maximum player salary 
implemented in the 1999 CBA. The maximum player salary is essentially a salary cap on the 
individual player level, where players of certain years of experience in the NBA cannot earn 
more than a league defined threshold. He found that controlling for productivity and other factors 
related to player salaries, the second and third best players on NBA rosters received more money 
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as a result of the maximum player salary. This conclusion could have implications on 
competitive balance as stars on talented teams will not want to make less money so they may 
relocate through free agency and receive the money they think they deserve, thus balancing out 
the talent dispersion in the NBA. Unfortunately, these results may not apply to the NBA 
anymore as the league has recently implemented the Designated Veteran Player Extension rule 
that allows players to make more money by signing back with their current team rather 
thanswitching teams during free agency in an effort to combat the creation of “super teams” 
(Windhorst, 2016). All in all, Kesenne (2000), Fort and Quirk (1995), Giocoli (2007), and 
Hastings (2015) all agree that the implementation of a salary cap should have a positive impact 
on competitive balance. Although, it is essential to discuss the validity of a salary cap, 
ultimately, the goal of this paper it to examine the effectiveness of a luxury tax.     
 The past literature shows that in theory, the salary cap should be enough to improve 
competitive balance in the NBA, but the league clearly thought it needed to continue to work on 
the problem. It is easy for teams to exceed the soft cap especially with the three exceptions 
unique to the NBA: Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird Exceptions. Not only does the luxury tax 
punish over spenders, but it incentivizes teams who are not over the cap. Dietl et al. (2010) 
analyzed the effect of a luxury tax on competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare in a 
closed sports league under the assumptions that supply of talent is elastic and clubs maximize 
profits. The authors used a model similar to Kesenne’ (2000) two-club model in which they 
analyzed a large and small market team with profit maximizing owners. Additionally, Dietl et 
al’s. (2010) model differed from Berri et al’s. (2005) in that they assumed elasticity of supply of 
player talent is different. The authors foundthat a luxury tax will produce a more balanced league 
by incentivizing small market teams to increase player salaries and large market teams to 
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decrease player salaries.Additionally, the results suggest that a more competitively balanced 
league will increase social welfare as a result of a higher quality league in general. The problem 
with Dietl et al’s. (2010) model is that it does not explore the impact of a win maximizing owner 
which is particularly relevant in today’s NBA.  
 In contrast Kaplan (2004) finds different results fromthe implementation of a luxury tax, 
and although he never mentioned win maximizing owners specifically, his results suggest that 
the behavior that win maximizers display will give them an advantage in a luxury tax system. 
Kaplan explored the implications of the NBA luxury tax model by identifying two “threats” to 
teams that hurt the franchises competitively as a result of the luxury tax. These threats include an 
inefficiency in the tax because of a lack of information due to escrow and penalty situations 
being calculated in the post-season, and more importantly,an overall decline in competitive 
balance because most teams will not sign extra talent due to fear of paying the tax. The idea that 
some teams will not sign extra talent in order to not pay the luxury tax is in line with the 
concepts explored in Giocoli (2007). If a luxury tax does indeed promote win maximizers to sign 
additional talent over the cap and thwart profit maximizers to not sign talent to stay under the 
cap, there could be detrimental consequences to a leagues overall competitive balance. It is 
difficult to say whether Dietl’s or Kaplan’s prediction of the outcome of competitive balance is 
true because there is not enough literature on the sole effect of the luxury tax in the NBA, so it is 
clear that more research needs to be done. 
 The current literature on the validity of combating competitive balance issues with a 
luxury tax is thin. Both Dietl et al. (2010) and Kaplan’s (2004) results are based off of theoretical 
models and ideas but fail to utilize real data in their discussion of the luxury tax. This paper is the 
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first to use NBA team and league level data in order to determine if the luxury tax has improved 
competitive balance over time.  
 
4 Data 
 
 This section will discuss the collection and utilization of data used in the OLS 
regressions. This paper analyzes 19 NBA seasons from 1998 to 2016 and includes team and 
league level data. All of the data were collected from Basketballreference.com, and Larry Coon’s 
Salary Cap Faq website: cbafaq.com. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the variables 
pertinent to my analysis. Every variable has 19 observations except for ALLSTAR because the 
all-star game was canceled in 1999 due to the lockout. The average standard deviation of 
winning percentage across the 19 NBA seasons was 0.16 suggesting that 68% of NBA teams had 
winning percentages between 0.34 and 0.66 during that span. Additionally, the large standard 
deviation of LUXTOTAL was $138.25 million compared to a mean of $171.70 million because 
of the simulated luxury tax values from 1998 to 2002. This will be further discussed in Section 6. 
The description of the rest of the variables can be found in Section 5. Team level data of winning 
percentages, luxury tax payments and talent measurements were collected for each of the 30 
NBA teams and condensed into league level data. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
    
VARIABLES Observations  Mean Standard    
Deviation                               
 
TEAMS 
 
19 
 
29.58 
 
0.51 
 
TALENT 
 
19 
 
0.67 
 
0.02 
 
dHHI 
 
19 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
SDWP 
 
19 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
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4.1        Team Data 
 
 All of the productivity data at the team level was collected from Basketballreference.com. 
The data collected includes: winning percentage, points scored, points allowed, number of all 
stars, and number of All NBA team members. Using these data, I am able to construct the three 
dependent variables of competitive balance including: standard deviation of winning percentage 
(SDWP), dHHI, and CBR. I chose SDWP because it is the most basic and commonly used 
variable to measure competitive balance. I also chose dHHI because it is generally a better 
indicator of within season variation in competitive balance because of the intuitive flaws of 
SDWP. Lastly, I chose to use CBR because both SDWP and dHHI only measure competitive 
balance on a one-year scale while CBR measures competitive balance over several seasons. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 display these measures over time.  Figures 1 and 2 show that the league was 
more competitively balanced in the early 2000s and has gotten worse since. In contrast, Figure 3 
shows the exact opposite as the league was competitively unbalanced in the early 2000s and has 
since improved. The drastic increase in standard deviation of winning percentage and dHHI in 
2008 could be explained by the NBAs entrance into the super team era. In 2008, all-stars Kevin 
Garnett and Ray Allen were traded to the Boston Celtics and won a championship in their first 
year (Stein, 2007). Their three-year dominance of the NBA led to the domino effect of all-stars 
leaving their franchises in order to compete for championships including LeBron James in 2010. 
CBR 19 0.76 0.08 
 
ALLSTAR 
 
18 
 
4.64 
 
0.46 
 
ALLNBA 
 
19 
 
6.91 
 
0.53 
 
LUXTOTAL 
 
19 
 
171.70 
 
138.25 
    
LUXDIS 19 46.94 18.95 
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Figures 1 and 2 show competitive balance has since improved since 2009, but the super team 
era’s competitive balance is much worse than the previous five seasons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Standard Deviation of Winning Percentage over 19 NBA seasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: dHHI over 19 NBA seasons 
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Figure 3: Competitive Balance Ratio over 19 NBA seasons.   
  
 Additionally, all of the luxury tax data for individual teams were retrieved from Larry  
Coon’s Salary Cap Faq website: cbafaq.com. This included the single season amount of luxury 
tax paid per season, and the total amount of luxury tax paid by every NBA franchise from 2003 
to 2016. These data were used to create independent variables of total luxury tax payments and 
distribution of luxury tax payments in order to attempt to explain the competitive balance 
measures. The total amount of luxury tax paid by each franchise can be seen in Figure 4. It is 
clear that most of the league’s franchises pay close to the same amount of taxes while a few 
franchises pay a significantly more. The teams that pay the highest amount of luxury taxes tend 
to either be in a big market, for example New York and Los Angeles, or have a win maximizing 
owner like Mark Cuban from the Dallas Mavericks. As seen in Table 3, paying more luxury tax 
generally is correlated with a higher winning percentage as the Dallas Mavericks win 0.52% of 
their games without paying the luxury tax and 0.68% of their games while paying the luxury tax. 
Unfortunately for the New York Knicks, this is not always the case. New York has paid the most 
luxury tax in the NBA but actually has a lower winning percentage when they pay the tax 
compared to when they do not. This rare circumstance is most likely caused by poor ownership, 
managing, and coaching decisions.  
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Figure 4: Total amount of luxury tax payments by every NBA team from 2003 to 2016 
 
 
4.2       League Data  
 
 The league level data was created by condensing all of the team level data into one 
number per year. For example: each team in a given year has its own dHHI value, so in order to 
get a league wide measure for dHHI, the individual measures of each of the 30 NBA teams are 
summed into one number. The league level luxury tax data are presented in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figure 5 shows the total amount of luxury tax paid by all 30 NBA teams from 1998-2016 and 
Figure 6 shows the percent of teams that paid the luxury tax in every season. Although it is true 
the luxury tax was introduced in 2003, in this analysis I make the assumption that in the seasons 
from 1998-2002, any dollar above the salary cap in a given season would have been luxury tax 
payments. In this assumption I use the luxury tax policy from 2003 to 2012 in which $1 over the 
salary cap equates to $1 in luxury tax payment. For example: in 1998 the salary cap was set at 
$26.9 million. In that season the New York Knicks paid $53.9 million for player salaries, so in 
my analysis I would have the Knicks paying $27 million in luxury tax. Unfortunately, I was not 
able to find data on which players signed Rookie, Midlevel, and Larry Bird exceptions for the 
1998 to 2002 seasons, so the luxury tax values may be too high.  
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 In addition to the three dependent variables of competitive balance previously mentioned, 
I calculated HHI which is the dispersion of championships won in a given period of time. HHI is 
presented in Table 5 and calculated in accordance to the three eras of the luxury tax, which will 
be further explained in Section 5. The NBA is more competitively balanced when HHI is lower 
because a variety of teams are winning the championship in a given period of time rather than 
just a few. HHI is lower in the seasons following the implementation of the luxury tax suggesting 
the NBA is more competitively balanced. The reason why HHI from 1998 to 2002 is almost 
double the two other eras, is because the Los Angeles Lakers won three out of the five 
championships in that time period, while in the following 15 years, eight different teams won the 
NBA championship (Springer, 2002).    
Table 5:HHI in the NBA over the three eras of luxury tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sum of luxury tax payments made by NBA teams over 19 seasons 
 
 
 
Seasons HHI 
1998-2002 0.44 
2003-2012 0.2 
20013-2016 0.25 
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Figure 6: Percent of NBA teams that paid the luxury tax over 19 NBA seasons. 
#The luxury tax was implemented in 2003 so before 2003, NBA teams did not pay luxury tax but the bar graph 
representssimulated luxury tax in that given year. 
 
5 Model 
 
 This section describes the model used in this paper along with a description of variables 
used in the regressions.The regression I use is similar to the methodology used in Larsen et al. 
(2006) as well as Couture (2016). Both Larsen et al. (2006) and Couture (2016) use the same 
TALENT measure that I do, while Couture (2016) also analyses SDWP and dHHI. I have added 
several independent variables and one dependent variable to my model in order to attempt to 
predict competitive balance more accurately.  I use three equations in my regression at the league 
level: 
 
SDWP = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt 
 5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9ERA13 + t      (1) 
 
dHHI = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt 
 5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9tERA13 + t      (2) 
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CBR = 0 + 1TEAMSt + 2TALENTt + 3ALLSTARt + 4ALLNBAt 
 5LUXTOTt + 6LUXDISt + 7ERA98 + 8ERA03 + 9ERA13 + t     (3) 
 
Where: 
SDWP The league wide standard deviation of winning percentage in a given year. 
dHHI A single season measure of competitive balance 
CBR A measure of competitive balance over several seasons 
TEAMS The number of teams in the NBA in a given season. 
TALENT A measure of player talent. 
ALLSTAR A measure of team talent defined by the distribution of all stars per team. 
ALLNBA A measure of team talent defined by the distribution of post-season All 
NBA award winners per team. 
LUXTOT The total amount of luxury tax paid by NBA teams in a given year. 
LUXDIS The dispersion of luxury tax payments between NBA teams in a 
given year 
ERA98 1 if the seasons were from 1998 to 2002, 0 if otherwise 
ERA03 1 if the seasons were from 2003 to 2012, 0 if otherwise 
ERA13 1 if the seasons were from 2013 to 2016, 0 if otherwise 
 
 The primary goal of this paper is to analyze if the introduction of a luxury tax affected 
competitive balance in the NBA. In order to fully investigate that inquiry, I looked at the 
dispersion of talent in the NBA to see if that affected competitive balance in any way. The first 
measure of talent is taken from Larsen (2006). It is a broad assumption of talent, but is designed 
to take into account the quality of the players, coaching staff, training staff and front office, and 
is defined as:  
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TALENT = HHIPF + HHIPA 
 
Where HHIPF, the measure of offensive talent, is defined as: 
 
HHIPPFt= ∑ (
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒
)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1  
   
and HHIPA, the measure of defensive talent is defined as:  
 
   HHIPPAt = ∑ (
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒
)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
This measure of talent attempts to capture both the offensive and defensive talent of a team by 
calculating where a team ranks among points scored and points allowed in a given season 
compared to the rest of the NBA. Although this measure is able to capture some of the talent on 
an NBA team, it is too broad and may not fully capture how much talent is on a given NBA 
roster. In order to combat this, I created the measures ALLSTAR and ALLNBA to capture the 
true dispersion of talent in the NBA which are similar to standard deviation measures. In the 
NBA, an “all star” is usually the best player on a team and is voted in by fans to play in the 
annual all star game. These elite group of players perform at a much higher level than the 
average NBA player and because of that have a greater impact on games. Depending on injuries 
or other factors that would lead to a player getting replaced in the all star game, there are 24 total 
players selected to the all star team. A perfectly competitive league may have 1 all star from 12 
teams in the Eastern Conference, and 12 teams in the Western Conference but that is not always 
the case. For example: in 2011 the Boston Celtics had four players selected from their team to 
play in the all star game while 14 different teams had zero all stars selected. The ALLSTAR 
variable is defined as: 
√∑ 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖 −  (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟
𝑁
)
2
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where All Stars is the number of all-stars on team i, Total All Stars is the total amount of all-stars 
in the NBA, and N is the number of teams in a given year.  
 For the same reasons that the TALENT measure may not capture a team’s total amount 
of talent, the ALLSTAR variable is not enough to capture how much talent is on a given team. 
The last Talent measure ALLNBA is similar to ALLSTAR. At the end of the NBA season, the 
15 best offensive and 10 best defensive players are placed on an “all-NBA team”. The five best 
players are awarded to the first team All-NBA, the next five best players are awarded to the 
second team All-NBA, and the next five best players are awarded to the third team All-NBA. 
The same process is done for ALL-NBA defensive teams, and ALL-NBA teams are a great 
indicator of how much talent is or is not stacked on a roster. In order to be considered for the 
ALLNBA variable, a player must have won the Most Valuable Player award, the Defensive 
Player of the Year award, or been placed on the first, second, or third all offensive or defensive 
NBA teams. This adds up to 27 possible slots to be filled by players every year. Uniquely for this 
variable, one player could “earn” more than one of the 27 possible All NBA slots in this analysis.  
For example: in 2012 LeBron James won the MVP award and was placed on both 1st team all-
NBA and 1st team all-defense, which would amount three points for the Miami Heat in ALLNBA 
(Basketball Reference, 2017). The ALLNBA variable is defined as: 
√∑ 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝐵𝐴𝑖 −  (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝐵𝐴
𝑁
)
2
 
 
 
Where All NBA is the number of All NBA players on team i, Total ALL NBA is the total number 
of ALL-NBA players in the NBA, and N is the number of teams.  
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 Lastly, the three ERA variables are meant to capture the three eras of the luxury tax in the 
NBA. This paper examines NBA season from 1998 to 2016. ERA98 examines the seasons from 
1998 to 2002 because the luxury tax was implemented in 2003 and this era acts a control or 
comparison group. From 2003 to 2012 a luxury tax was implemented, but the tax was set up so 
that a team over the salary cap paid $1 in luxury tax for every $1 they were over the cap. 
However, in 2013 the luxury tax policy changed so into an increasing tax rate to try to stop teams 
from over spending as seen in 2.  
 I would expect the coefficient for TEAM, TALENT, ALLSTAR, and ALLNBA to all be 
positive because the more concentrated talent is on a given team, the less competitively balanced 
the league will be. I hypothesize this based on the results of (Rockerbie, 2014) that suggested 
stars in the NBA have greater impacts on individual games more than any other sport. Therefore, 
asthe TALENT, ALLSTAR, and ALLNBA measures become higher, competitive balance 
declines.Additionally, I would expect LUXTOT and LUXDIS to be positive. The more luxury 
tax money spent, the more teams are attempting to stack talent and increase their winning 
percentage.This is based on the findings displayed in Table 3 that show in most cases, winning 
percentages of teams increase when they pay the luxury tax. Similar to the variables that measure 
the dispersion of talent, competitive balance should decrease if the luxury tax is dispersed 
unevenly. For example, if only two teams pay a high amount of luxury tax in one season, then 
LUXDIS will be high and competitive balance should be lower compared to a season where 
every team is paying the luxury tax. Lastly, I expect the ERA03 and ERA13 to be negative 
because they are dummy variables being compared to ERA98 and I predict competitive balance 
will be improved after 2003. I hypothesize that in the years after the luxury was implemented in 
the NBA, competitive balance will improve simply because I believe the luxury tax is an 
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effective way to improve competitive balance. This hypothesis also matches the results from 
Dietl et al.(2010) that found the implementation of a luxury tax will produce a more balanced 
league.  
 In this analysis I run two separate regressions. The first having the assumption of 
simulated luxury tax for the 1998 to 2002 seasons. As mentioned earlier, this assumption 
calculates what teams would be paying in luxury tax if it had been established in those seasons. 
This will be regression one. Regression two will assume zero luxury tax payments until the 2003 
NBA season.  
6 Results 
 
    6.1     Simulated Luxury Tax 
 
 The results from regression one are presented in Table 6. The only statistically significant 
finding was the effect of ERA03 on dHHI (p<0.1), but the signs and magnitudes of the other 
coefficients might suggest trends in competitive balance. Because the three ERA variables are 
dummies, ERA03 and ERA13 are being compared to ERA98. Thus, the significance and 
negativity of ERA03 in equation 2 means that competitive balance was significantly improved in 
the 2003 to 2012 seasons compared to the 1998 to 2002 seasons. Additionally, the signs of the 
coefficients for equation 1 and 2 are identical suggesting that SDWP and dHHI are similarly 
affected by the independent variables, although their scales and interpretations are different. On 
the other hand, the coefficients for TALENT, ALLSTAR, LUXDIS, ERA03, and ERA13 in 
equation 3 were different from equations 1 and 2 (Table 6). A negative coefficient in this 
regression means the independent variable positively affects or improves competitive balance. 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression OneResults 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SDWP dHHI CBR 
 
TEAMS 
 
-0.00527 
 
-0.000238 
 
-0.0840 
 (0.0204) (0.000812) (0.0855) 
 
TALENT -5.347 -0.232 21.63 
 (4.842) (0.192) (20.24) 
 
ALLSTAR 0.00534 0.000160 -0.0286 
 (0.0119) (0.000473) (0.0498) 
 
ALLNBA 0.01000 0.000385 0.0119 
 (0.00996) (0.000396) (0.0417) 
 
LUXTOTAL -4.25e-05 -2.12e-06 -2.07e-06 
 (6.18e-05) (2.45e-06) (0.000258) 
 
LUXDIS 0.000151 7.01e-06 -0.000336 
 (0.000358) (1.42e-05) (0.00150) 
 
ERA03 -0.0252 -0.00119* 0.0712 
 (0.0145) (0.000576) (0.0606) 
 
ERA13 -0.0230 -0.00108 0.151 
 (0.0212) (0.000841) (0.0885) 
    
Constant 0.597 0.0234 1.792 
 (0.913) (0.0362) (3.814) 
    
Observations 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.443 0.471 0.648 
se in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 I will first discuss the results for SDWP and dHHI because they have identical coefficient 
signs, and discuss CBR after for each variable.Surprisingly all three equations produced a 
negative coefficient for the total amount of luxury tax payments. This result suggests that the 
more luxury tax being paid at the league level, the more competitively balanced the league 
becomes. For every one-dollar increase in luxury tax payments, competitive balance increases by 
4.25e-05, 2.12e-06, and 2.07e-06 for SDWP, dHHI and CBR respectively. Although the results 
provide a different conclusion from my hypothesis, there are a couple theories that could explain 
this. First, I assumed that the more luxury taxes being paid equated to more talent being stacked. 
Although this could be true, the dispersion of luxury tax will define if the league is more 
competitive or not. In other words, even if the total amount of luxury tax paid is increasing every 
year, as long as the dispersion of payments stays constant between the teams, then talent is being 
stacked somewhat evenly. Another possibility is my assumption of luxury tax payments before 
2003 may have skewed the data. For example: in this regression, the average amount of assumed 
luxury tax paid per year before 2003 was $338 million while the average amount of luxury tax 
paid per year after 2003 was $94.6 million. This is a stark difference which shows the potential 
of skewed data. All in all, the assumption of pre-2003 luxury tax may not be an accurate 
representation as it does not take contract exceptions into account for any of the 29 NBA teams.  
 As mentioned above, the distribution of luxury tax payments may be a better indicator of 
competitive balance than just the total amount of luxury tax paid. Equations 1 and 2, as expected, 
produce a positive coefficient suggesting the more evenly distributed the luxury tax payments are 
between the 30 NBA teams, the more competitive balance improves. Equation 3 on the other 
hand produces a negative coefficient. The regression suggests a one-unit increase in luxury tax 
dispersion increases SDWP by 0.0000151 and dHHI by 7.01e-06, and decreases CBR by 
 37 
0.000336. Again, none of the LUXDIS coefficients are statistically significant but the 
distribution of tax payments could have been skewed by the assumptions made for regression 
one. 
 The measure for concentration of talent is insignificant and unexpectedly negative in 
equations 1 and 2. A one-unit increase in talent dispersion increases SDWP by 5.347 and dHHI 
by 0.232. The regression suggests that as the concentration of talent increases, competitive 
balance improves. In other words, if a few teams have more stacked talent than the rest of the 
league, competitive balance is improved. On the other hand, equation 3 suggests the opposite as 
a one-unit increase in talent dispersion increases CBR by 21.63. This implies that as the 
concentration of talent decreases, the more competitive balance improves which intuitively 
makes more sense.  
 As expected, the coefficients of dispersion of all-stars and All-NBA players are positive 
in equations 1 and 2. A one-unit increase in all-star dispersion increases SDWP by 0.00534and 
dHHI by 0.000160, while a one-unit increase in All-NBA dispersion increases SDWP by0.01000 
and dHHI by 0.000385. This suggests the more dispersed all-stars and All-NBA players are 
throughout the league, the more competitively balanced the league becomes. On the other hand, 
equation 3 produced a negative coefficient for all star dispersion but none of the variables were 
significant. 
 Additionally, equation 1 and 2 suggest that as the number of teams increases, competitive 
balance improves, although this coefficient is insignificant. This can be seen in Figure 1 and 2 
when a 30th team was added to the NBA in 2003, both SDWP and dHHI slightly decreased until 
2007 thus improving competitive balance. CBR displayed a positive coefficient even though 
Figure 3 shows competitive balance increasing after 2003. Intuitively, an argument could be 
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madeto either improve or worsen competitive balance with an addition of a new team. When a 
new team is added to the NBA, they take part in an expansion draft in which the new team picks 
designated players from the other NBA teams. This could improve competitive balance if the 
players chosen are talented and work well together, thus making the expansion team competitive. 
On the other hand, if the players chosen do not have good chemistry on the court, they will be a 
losing team, thus making the league less competitive. Additionally, according to Berri et al. 
(2005), there is a short supply of tall players in the NBA, specifically tall players that are talented 
as well. If a new team is added to the league, talent could be dispersed too thin and create a non-
competitive team. 
 The last variables in regression one are the two time dummy variables comparing ERA03 
and ERA13 to ERA98. Like most of the results, equations 1 and 2 have differing signs of 
coefficients than equation 3. Both ERA03 and ERA13 are negative suggesting that competitive 
balanced has improved since the 1998 to 2002 seasons. In equation 2, ERA03 supplies the only 
statistically significant finding in regression one, further suggesting that ERA98 was the least 
competitively balanced ERA being analyzed. With regards to equation 3, CBR does not 
necessarily measure competitive balance on a year to year basis but rather how team’s 
performance differs over time. Therefore, the positive coefficient for both ERA03 and ERA13 
may suggest that team performance varies more often than in ERA98.  
 
6.2     Non-simulated Luxury Tax Payments  
 
 The results from regression two are presented in Table 7. Regression two uses the same 
three equations as regression one but does not assume any luxury tax payments before the 2003 
NBA season. Therefore, in this regression, all luxury tax payments before 2003 are considered to 
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be 0. As a result, in comparison to regression one, there is much more statistical significance 
found in the results of regression two. There was no significance found in equation 3, but 
TALENT, LUXTOTAL, and ERA03 were significant in equation1 while TALENT, 
LUXTOTAL, ERA03, and ERA13 were significant in equation 2. 
 
 
Table 7: Regression TwoResults 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SDWP dHHI CBR 
 
TEAMS 
 
0.00245 
 
0.000140 
 
-0.0692 
 (0.0114) (0.000454) (0.0559) 
 
TALENT -6.891* -0.283* 17.71 
 (3.610) (0.144) (17.67) 
 
ALLSTAR 0.0119 0.000455 -0.0129 
 (0.00959) (0.000381) (0.0470) 
 
ALLNBA 0.0101 0.000409 0.0221 
 (0.00854) (0.000340) (0.0418) 
 
LUXTOTAL 0.000330* 1.32e-05* 0.000598 
 (0.000166) (6.62e-06) (0.000814) 
 
LUXDIS -0.000387 -1.41e-05 -0.000635 
 (0.000401) (1.60e-05) (0.00196) 
 
ERA03 -0.0457** -0.00202** 0.0219 
 (0.0162) (0.000646) (0.0796) 
 
ERA13 -0.0387 -0.00175* 0.0929 
 (0.0212) (0.000844) (0.104) 
    
Constant 0.445 0.0143 1.478 
 (0.502) (0.0200) (2.458) 
    
Observations 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.621 0.639 0.672 
se in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Not surprisingly, regression two produced completely different results with regards to the 
impact of total luxury tax payments in the league. Not only did the signs change in all three 
equations from negative to positive, but there was significance found in equations 1 and 2. For 
every one-dollar increase in luxury tax payments, competitive balance increases by0.000330, 
1.32e-05, and0.000598 for SDWP, dHHI and CBR respectively.The positive coefficient suggests 
as the total amount of luxury taxes being paid increases, competitive balance decreases. These 
results suggest that the total amount of luxury tax paid had significant impacts on both SDWP 
and dHHI. This affirms my original hypothesis that the more teams spend in the luxury tax, the 
more talent is being stacked around the league and thus the less competitively balanced the 
league becomes. Additionally, the dispersion of luxury tax payments between teams again was 
not significant but the signs did change from positive to negative in regression two. The 
regression suggests that a one-unit increase in luxury tax dispersion decreases SDWP 
by0.000387,dHHI by 1.41e-05, and CBR by 0.000635. The negative signs suggest, as the luxury 
tax payments are more equally dispersed between the 30 NBA teams, the more competitively 
balanced the league becomes. 
 In comparison to regression one, the dummy time variable’s coefficients stayed 
consistent in all three equations but gained significance in regression two. There was no 
significance found in equation 3 but ERA03 was significant in both equation 1 and 2 while 
ERA13 was only significant in equation 1. The negative coefficient of ERA 03 coupled with 
significance in both equations 1 and 2 suggest that competitive balance significantly improved in 
comparison to ERA98. The same could be said with equation 2 and ERA13. As mentioned 
above, CBR measures how a team’s performance differs over time. The coefficient may be 
positive because team’s performances may have varied less in ERA98 than in ERA03 and 
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ERA13. Overall with the significant improvement in the eras following the 1998 to 2002 seasons 
it seems that Dietl et al’s. (2010) prediction of improved competitive balance after the 
implementation of a luxury tax was correct. 
 The dispersion of all-stars between NBA teams did not change signs or significance from 
regression one to regression two. The coefficients were positive for equations 1 and 2, and 
negative for equation 3. The regression suggests a one-unit increase in all star dispersion 
decreases SDWP by 0.0119 and dHHI by0.000455, and decreases CBR by 0.0129.As mentioned 
before, the positive coefficient for ALLSTAR suggests that as dispersion of all stars decreases 
amongst the teams, competitive balance worsens. Additionally, in comparison of regression one 
to regression two, the coefficients and significance of ALLNBA did not change in all three 
equations. 
 The coefficients for the number of teams in the NBA switched from negative to positive 
in equations 1 and 2, suggesting that as more teams join the NBA, the league’s competitive 
balance worsens. With regards to the concentration of talent in the league, none of the 
coefficients changed signs within the three equations, but TALENT became significant in 
equations 1 and 2. That means that the concentration of talent significantly decreases SDWP and 
dHHI thus improving competitive balance.  
 
7 Discussion 
 The goal of this paper was to determine if the NBA luxury tax had improved competitive 
balance since its implementation in 2003. There is a large gap in luxury tax research as no paper 
has used NBA data to analyze the impact of the luxury tax on competitive balance. To this date, 
only theoretical models and analysis of the NBA luxury tax have been examined. For that reason, 
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this investigation and analysis of the NBA luxury tax has made a significant contribution to 
sports economic literature. Regression one with a simulated luxury tax from 1998 to 2002 had 
significantly different results from regression two which set luxury tax payments before 2003 at 
zero. Based on the results of regression two, the total amount of luxury tax payments made by all 
teams in a given year, had a significant effect on both standard deviation of winning percentage 
and dHHI. Additionally, the seasons from 2003 to 2012 when the luxury tax was first 
implemented, had significantly lower standard deviation of winning percentages and dHHI 
compared to the seasons with no luxury tax penalty. The differences in significance from 
regression one to regression two suggest that with the introduction of a luxury tax, talent became 
more expensive. Before the luxury tax, teams could exceed the salary cap and stack as much 
talent as they wanted with no penalty mechanism in place, but the luxury tax made talent costlier. 
Therefore, a team wanting to sign an all-star, free-agent in order to compete for a championship 
in 2010 would be more expensive compared to 2000. For this reason, competitive balance was 
significantly improved after the implementation of the luxury tax because NBA teams who were 
over the salary cap would chose not to sign extra talent, therefore dispersing talent to a team who 
is comfortably under the salary cap. 
 To clarify, the implementation of the luxury tax is not the sole reason for improved 
competitive balance in the NBA. Other policies like free agency, revenue sharing, and the 
reverse-order entry draft could have also improved competitive balance over time.Although the 
luxury tax cannot take full credit for the improvement in competitive balance, it is certainly part 
of the reason for improvements.  
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7.1     Policy Implications  
 It is clear that the luxury tax has helped in improving competitive balance in the NBA 
over the last 13 seasons. Although true in most economics of sports studies, the increased tax 
bracket component of the luxury tax was only implemented in 2013, making the sample size of 
this study too small. Therefore, the regressions may not have been able to capture its true effects. 
As a result, it is difficult to say which luxury tax policy was more effective in improving 
competitive balance. With that being said, the results of this analysis suggest the luxury tax has 
improved competitive balance over time and should not be changed if the NBA is satisfied with 
the current state of competitive balance. On the other hand, if the NBA league office was truly 
concerned with the current state of competitive balance, they would follow suit of the NFL and 
NHL and implement a hard salary cap which has been shown to improve competitive 
balance.With the soft salary cap being such an integral part of how the NBA functions, it may be 
difficult to simply shift the soft salary cap into a hard salary cap. Therefore, if the NBA feels 
teams are still stacking talent too easily, they could consider removing the Rookie, Mid-level, 
and Larry Bird contract exceptions that further allow teams to exceed the soft salary cap. This is 
a more realistic and obtainable goal for the NBA in inhibiting a teams’ ability to stack talent.   
 
7.2     Limitations of Research 
 It is worth noting the limitations of this study in order to improve potential future 
research topics. The first limitation is the lack of contract information in the 1998 to 2002 
seasons. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the luxury tax payments of the 1998 to 2002 seasons 
were estimated based on amount of money above the given year’s salary cap. This analysis did 
not take into account any contracts that would have exempted teams from paying the luxury tax. 
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Therefore, in most cases my estimation of luxury tax payments were too high. Additionally, 
salary cap and luxury tax data has not been released for the 2017 or 2018 seasons which limited 
my data set to only four years of analysis in my ERA13 variable. This did not leave enough room 
to fully estimate the effect of the increasing luxury tax bracket and repeater offense policies 
implemented in 2013. Moreover, in my analysis I assume that any luxury tax payment equates to 
an addition of talent. In other words, the team is automatically better off after paying the luxury 
than before adding talent and paying the luxury tax. Although this is mostly true, this assumption 
is not always the case. An example of a team who paid the luxury tax and did not improve 
performance was the 2014 Brooklyn Nets who paid a record $90.6 million and lost in the second 
round of the playoffs (Basketball Reference, 2017). In the previous year they only paid $12.9 
million in luxury tax and similarly made it to the first round of the playoffs. If my assumption 
was correct, the team who paid the most luxury tax in NBA history should be the best team as 
well, which is clearly not the case.  
 
7.3     Future Research 
 My paper opens up several opportunities for future research in the NBA. Other papers 
can attempt to fill the gaps of omitted variables in my model to try to better explain change in 
competitive balance. Additionally, all measures of competitive balance have fundamental flaws 
so an analysis of different measures of competitive balance would be an interesting addition. 
Moreover, an addition to this topic would be the implementation of the distinction between profit 
and win maximizing owners into the model as this could have an impact on which teams pay the 
luxury tax. Lastly, future research could attempt to increase the sample size of the pre-luxury tax 
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era along with the most recent NBA seasons in order to capture and more clear snapshot of 
competitive balance in the NBA.   
 
7.4     Conclusion 
 
 Competitive balance has been an issue in the NBA for years. This problem has only been 
exacerbated with the introduction of the new super team era in 2010. Past literature has proven 
that if the talent level between teams is too uneven, and game outcomes are too predictable, then 
spectators will not watch. The NBA has created several policies including the salary cap and 
luxury tax in order to combat competitive imbalance within the league. Although most 
economists suggest these policies should improve competitive balance, the NBA is still the least 
competitive major sport in North America even 14 years after the implementation of the luxury 
tax. This paper provides evidence that the luxury tax has improved competitive balance in the 
last 19 years, but has clearly not had enough of a substantial effect. Although there is an 
abundance of literature on the effect of a salary cap on competitive balance in sports leagues, this 
is the first paper that implements economic theory and available data on how the luxury tax has 
affected competitive balance in the NBA. More research needs to be completed in order to truly 
gauge the effectiveness of a luxury tax, but the results of this analysis provide an insight to its 
potential.  
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